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THE CHALLENGE OF THE ISLAMIC REFORM
Foran understanding of Islam in Southeast Asia todaythere is no conceptmore important than that of Islamic reform/revival. At the outsetitshould be noted that Islamic reform/revival is something much broaderthan what is popularly described as “fundamentalist”. The latterterm has a Christian derivation and is appliedwith varying degreesof accuracy to some types of Islamic reform/revival. The Muslimshoweverdo not use such a term nor recognize the validity and legitimacy of theterm to describe the Islamic reform/revival today.
Theradical Islamic movement is often referred to as a movement of Islamicfundamentalists. Radical Islam rejects the very idea of the western conceptof nation-state and its promises. It is opposed to the Islamic conceptof the ummahthe universal Islamic communitywhich transcends localand regional differences and does not recognize national ones and whoseexistence can be guaranteed only by government based upon the Shari’a.
TheIslamic State movement is striving to establish a state governed in accordancewith the Islamic lawShari’a. And since the Shari’a originatesfrom divine revelationit may not be developed or modifiedbut merelyapplied. Its application involves interpretation in particular cases andenforcement not legislation in the sense of innovative law-making.
Theruler (Khalifat) of the Islamic State is legitimate insofar as he ensuresthe application of the Shari’a and thereby preserves the moral orderupon which the integrity of the community of believers depends. That isto saythat the Khalifat performs his functions within the legal parameterslaid down in advance and these are immutable.
Itis the common view of all radical Islamic movements that the true Islamicgovernment was realized under the rule of the first four “rightlyguided” caliphs: Abu Bakr (632-634)‘Umar (634-644)‘Uthman(644-656) and ‘Ali (656-661).
RadicalIslamin generalderives its inspiration from the “nahda”(renaissance)that is stimulated by the teachings of the salafiyya movement.The salafiyya movement preaches a reformation of Islam on the basis ofa return to a strict adherence to the Qur’an and the hadith... andthus the purification of the faith of all blameworthy innovations.
Thereform movement (Islah) traces its origin to the celebrated Egyptian reformerShayk Muhammad ‘Abduh. Its principal purpose is to promote a reformeduralist and puritan Islam and the revival of Arabic language andculture.
TheDa’wah movement is not to be understood simply as preaching crystallizedaround mission (da’i). It is a religious reform which embraces allprofane aspects capable of reinforcing the cohesion of the group. It feelsitself to be invested with a mission of reform which leads necessarilyinto a mission of conversion from the necessity of commanding that whichis proper and forbidding that which is reprehensible. This mission impliesthe jihad. This logic involves ultimately the exercise of political power.But the taking of power is not an explicit objectivefor the first dutyis the censorship of morals (hisba) and those who do not observe goodmorals are unbelievers to be combatted.
Thevarious Islamic movements in Southeast Asiaas everywhere in Islamiccountriesdiffer in their understanding of a modern Islamic Renewal.There are those who are inspired by the ancient grandeur of Islam andwant to go back as far as possible to the institutions and the way ofthinking and acting during the Rashidun Khalifat. On the other handthereare those who try to find means and ways to reconcile the spirit of Islamwith the exigencies of our modern technical era and the conditions ofa modern state in which the old rules of the Shari’a cannot possiblyremain unaltered. Largelythere are those who defend Islam against theincreasing menace of communism and secularization in contemporary SoutheastAsia.
Thereare four features whichmore or lessdescribe the current SoutheastAsian Islamic movements. First and foremostthey are a minority. Onlya minority Muslim population are affected by these movements. For thevast majority of Asian Muslimsbeing Muslim entails no strict adherenceto or particular knowledge of Islam as laid down by the Qur’antheHadithand the Shari’a. For these nominal or statistical MuslimsIslam is little more than a thin veneer of Arabic phrases over a Hindu-Buddhist-animistbase. They are definitely Muslimsbecause they identify themselves assuchbut the religion they practice is a syncretic and nativistic variantthat bears little resemblance to its West Asian prototype. Religion istheir life with all its attendant rituals and beliefs built up over thecenturies that provide the framework for religion and not vice versa.Thusthe Muslims affected by the various Islamic movements remain theminority.
Thesecond distinguishing feature of these Islamic movements is their traditionallink to specific economic classes. Since it was brought to the shoresof JavaSumatraMalaccaJohoreand Mindanao by Arab traders in the13th and the 14th centuriesIslam has found some of its most devotedfollowers among the mercantile classeseither urban entrepreneurs ortraders who have accumulated extensive landholdings in rural areas andconstituted a kind of Kulak class.
Whileit is true that the class lines of these Islamic movements have blurredsomewhat over the years and an increasing number of lower middle classand middle class professionals such as school teachers have joined theranksthe movements’ commercial base remains strong. Thustheytoo have a vested interest in the continued stability of the prevailinggovernment. The militancy that these movements display against secularizationand their aggressive advocacy for Islam is due more to their perceivedprospects of a PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) comeback as in the caseof Indonesia.
Thethird feature is their lack of unity. The ethnic as well as geographicalfactors contribute to the division among its ranks. From the very beginningthe Islamic movements have been divided into two major factions: the traditionalistswho are rural folks and educated in Pesantrens led by a Kiyaiand themodernists who are urban folks and heavily influenced by the Islamic Reformmovement in the Middle East.
Inaddition to these differencesthe movements are also divided ethnicallyand geographically. Their greatest strength is among the non-Javanese:the Sundanese of West Javathe Acehnese and Minangkabau of North andWest Sumatrarespectivelyand the Bugis of South Sulawesi. This is alsoevident among the Muslim Filipinos who are divided along ethnic lines.
Thefourth feature that may seem somewhat incongruous to what the Westernmedia used to portray is the fact that these movements are primarily asocial movement. This is not to deny the strong political colorationsthat these movements take onespecially given their strong desire fora loudermore representative voice in government. But the basic thrustsof these movements remain moral and social. The collective aiminsofaras there is oneis a society of uprightmoralpious individuals whohave a thorough understanding of Islam and a desire to live accordingto its principles. The chief activity of the proliferating Islamic groupsin large cities is Qur’anic study and proselytization. Thusthefears of many Christians that the hidden agenda of every Muslim movementis the creation of an Islamic state in which the Christians would be apersecuted minority are not well-founded.
Inour attempt to study the resurgence of Islam in Southeast Asiawe cannotdiscount the global environment in which the Islamic movements have arisen.Firstthe recent world-wide upsurge in Islam is not a sudden event. Itis rather the culmination of a long period in which Islam has been intensifyingand extending its influence. Islam is and has been for quite some timethe world’s fastest growing religion.
Secondthe Middle East war and its repercussions have changed the way Muslimsview themselves. Many Muslims around the world have become involved intellectuallyand emotionally if not also politically – with the Palestiniansin whom they see a most dramatic example of the heedless way Western powershave been willing to displace their fellow believers. Feeling displacedthemselves and anxious over their own futuremany Muslims in the ex-colonialworld thus somehow identify themselves as Palestinians too. This is particularlytrue in the case of the Philippines and Thailand where the Malay-Muslimminorities are engaged in the struggle for recognition and respect.
Thirdthe international politics of oil since 1973 has enabled those concernedfor the fate of the world’s culturally and politically beleagueredMuslims to command international attention.
Andfourthan institutional and infrastructure basis for world-wide Islamicsolidarity has been growing since the late ‘60s. An urgent concernhas thus developed – and been quite powerfully promoted – forthe future of embattled Muslims every where: a community based on a recognitionof common fate as well as common faith has emerged. | 
